

Fraud Risk Management and Assessment

David L. Cotton, CPA, CFE, CGFM Cotton & Company LLP Alexandria, VA 22314 www.cottoncpa.com

dcotton@cottoncpa.com

DAVID L. COTTON, CPA, CFE, CGFM COTTON & COMPANY LLP CHAIRMAN

Dave Cotton is chairman of Cotton & Company LLP, Certified Public Accountants, headquartered in Alexandria, Virginia. The firm was founded in 1981 and has a practice concentration in assisting Federal and State government agencies, inspectors general, and government grantees and contractors with a variety of government program-related assurance and advisory services. Cotton & Company has performed grant and contract, indirect cost rate, financial statement, financial related, and performance audits for more than two dozen Federal inspectors general as well as numerous other Federal and State agencies and programs.

Cotton & Company's Federal agency audit clients have included the U.S. Government Accountability Office, U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Transportation Command, U.S. House of Representatives, U.S. Capitol Police, U.S. Small Business Administration, U.S. Bureau of Prisons, Millennium Challenge Corporation, U.S. Marshals Service, and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives. Cotton & Company also assists numerous Federal agencies in preparing financial statements and improving financial management, accounting, and internal control systems.

Dave received a BS in mechanical engineering (1971) and an MBA in management science and labor relations (1972) from Lehigh University in Bethlehem, PA. He also pursued graduate studies in accounting and auditing at the University of Chicago Graduate School of Business (1977 to 1978). He is a Certified Public Accountant (CPA), Certified Fraud Examiner (CFE), and Certified Government Financial Manager (CGFM).

Dave served on the Advisory Council on Government Auditing Standards (the Council advises the United States Comptroller General on promulgation of *Government Auditing Standards*—GAO's yellow book) from 2006 to 2009. He served on the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) Anti-Fraud Programs and Controls Task Force and co-authored *Managing the Business Risk of Fraud: A Practical Guide*. He served on the American Institute of CPAs Anti-Fraud Task Force and co-authored *Management Override: The Achilles Heel of Fraud Prevention*. Dave is the past-chair of the AICPA Federal Accounting and Auditing Subcommittee and has served on the AICPA Governmental Accounting and Auditing Committee and the Government Technical Standards Subcommittee of the AICPA Professional Ethics Executive Committee. Dave chaired the Fraud Risk Management Task Force, sponsored by COSO and ACFE and is a principal author of the *COSO-ACFE Fraud Risk Management Guide*.

Dave served on the board of the Virginia Society of Certified Public Accountants (VSCPA) and on the VSCPA Litigation Services Committee, Professional Ethics Committee, Quality Review Committee, and Governmental Accounting and Auditing Committee. He is a member of the Association of Government Accountants (AGA) and past-advisory board chairman and past-president of the AGA Northern Virginia Chapter. He is also a member of the Institute of Internal Auditors and the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners.

Dave has testified as an expert in governmental accounting, auditing, and fraud issues before the United States Court of Federal Claims and other administrative and judicial bodies.

Dave has spoken frequently on cost accounting, professional ethics, and auditors' fraud detection responsibilities under SAS 99, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit. He has been an instructor for the George Washington University masters of accountancy program (Fraud Examination and Forensic Accounting), and has instructed for the George Mason University Small Business Development Center (Fundamentals of Accounting for Government Contracts).

Dave was the recipient of the ACFE 2018 Certified Fraud Examiner of the Year Award ("presented to a CFE who has demonstrated outstanding achievement in the field of fraud examination ... based on their contributions to the ACFE, to the profession, and to the community"); AGA's 2012 Educator Award ("to recognize individuals who have made significant contributions to the education and training of government financial managers"); and AGA's 2006 Barr Award ("to recognize the cumulative achievements of private sector individuals who throughout their careers have served as a role model for others and who have consistently exhibited the highest personal and professional standards").

Fraud Happens

- Most organizations think it can't happen to them
- Then are devastated when it does
- ACFE consistently estimates that the average organization loses about 5% of its revenues due to fraud annually
 - Median loss from a single case: \$150,000
 - 23% of cases studied resulted in losses of more than \$1,000,000
 - Frauds are always devastating and sometimes catastrophic

Fraud Risk Management and Assessment

- Fraud Risk Management's Historical Context
- Fraud Risk Management and the 2013 COSO Internal Control Framework
- The COSO/ACFE Fraud Risk Management Guide
 - Governance and the Control Environment
 - Fraud Risk Assessment
 - Fraud Control Activities
 - Information, Investigation, and Reporting
 - Monitoring
- My Predictions for the Future: What Can/Should Be Done to Empower Auditors to Find More Fraud; and Help Organizations Better Manage Fraud?

Historical Context

A Brief History ...

 ~4000 BC: In ancient Athens "Humble citizens and slaves were educated and employed as bookkeepers. For the most part, Athenians preferred public slaves as comptrollers and auditors because they could be tortured on the rack and freemen could not."*

^{* &}lt;u>The Reckoning: Financial Accountability and the Rise and Fall of Nations</u>, Jacob Soll, Basic Books, 2014.

A Brief History ...

- 1985: The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission was formed
 - American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA)
 - American Accounting Association (AAA)
 - Financial Executives Institute (FEI)
 - Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA)
 - National Association of Accountants (now the Institute of Management Accountants (IMA))

Report of the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting

October 1987

Treadway's 49 Recommendations

For public companies

- Tone at the top
- Internal accounting and audit functions
- Audit committee
- Management and audit committee reports
- "Opinion shopping"
- Quarterly reporting

For independent public accountants

- Fraud detection
- Audit quality
- Communications
- Audit standards-setting process

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Treadway's 49 Recommendations

For the SEC and others

- Tougher sanctions and criminal prosecution
- Improved regulation of public accounting
- SEC resources
- Improved regulation of financial institutions
- Better oversight by state boards of accountancy
- Insurance and liability crises

For educators

- Business and accounting curricula
- Professional certification examinations
- Continuing professional education
- Five-year accounting programs

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"Fraud" appears <u>554</u> times in the 183-page document.

Report of the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting

October 1987

A Brief History ...

- 1987: The Treadway Commission declared victory and disbanded, but COSO carried on
- 1992: COSO issued its Internal Control—Integrated Framework

May 9, 2019

Very little emphasis on fraud



Focus was on:

- Economy and efficiency of operations, including safeguarding of assets and achievement of desired outcomes;
- Reliability of financial and management reports; and
- Compliance with laws and regulations.

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Very little emphasis on fraud



"Fraud" appears <u>21</u> times in the 159-page document.

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A Brief History ...

- 1992 to 2001: The COSO Internal Control Framework gained broad recognition
- 2002: Sarbanes-Oxley Act became law
 - Section 404 mandates that all publicly traded companies must establish and report on internal controls
- 2002-2012: The COSO Internal Control Framework became the globally recognized set of best practices related to establishing and maintaining internal controls
 - All US publicly-traded companies follow the COSO framework


A Brief History ...

- 2005: The AICPA formed a task force to define "attestable criteria" for fraud risk management
- That task force instead wrote/issue the "Achilles' Heel" publication



A Brief History ...

• 2007: An IIA, ACFE, AICPA Task Force published Managing the Business Risk of Fraud—A Practical Guide ("attestable criteria" for fraud risk management)




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
http://www.cottoncpa.com/w pcontent/uploads/2014/08/Ma nagingTheBusinessRiskofFrau d.pdf

Published in 2007

A Brief History ...

- May 2013: COSO updated its *Internal Control Integrated Framework* and added 17 Principles
 - Principle #8: The organization considers the potential for fraud in assessing risks to the achievement of objectives.





A Brief History ...

 2014: In response to user demands, COSO and ACFE formed a new task force to develop more detailed guidance on assessing fraud risk

Fraud Risk Management and the 2013 COSO Internal Control Framework

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Joint ACFE-COSO Task Force

Barbara Andrews

AICPA

CAATS

Michael Birdsall Comcast Corporation

Toby Bishop Formerly ACFE, Deloitte

Margot Cella Center for Audit Quality

David Coderre

David L. Cotton, Chair

Cotton & Company LLP

James Dalkin

GA0

Ron Durkin Durkin Forensic, Inc. **Bert Edwards**

Formerly State Department

Frank Faist Charter Communications

Eric Feldman

Affiliated Monitors, Inc.

Dan George USAC

John D. Gill ACFE

Leslye Givarz Formerly AICPA, PCAOB

Cindi Hook Comcast Corporation

Sandra K. Johnigan Johnigan, PC **Bill Leone**

Norton Rose Fulbright

Andi McNeal ACFE

Linda Miller

Kemi Olateju General Electric

Chris Pembroke Crawford & Associates, PC

J. Michael Peppers University of Texas

Kelly Richmond Pope DePaul University

Carolyn Devine Saint University of Virginia Jeffrey Steinhoff KPMG

William Titera Formerly EY

Michael Ueltzen Ueltzen & Company

Pamela Verick Protiviti

Vincent Walden

Bill Warren PwC

Richard Woodford U.S. Coast Guard Investigative Service

Joint ACFE-COSO Advisory Panel

Dan Amiram

Columbia University Business School

Zahn Bozanic

The Ohio State University

Greg Brush

Tennessee Comptroller of Treasury

Tamia Buckingham

Massachusetts School Building Authority

Ashley L. Comer

James Madison University

Molly Dawson

Cotton & Company LLP

Eric Eisenstein

Cotton & Company LLP

Michael Justus

University of Nebraska

Theresa Nellis-Matson

New York Office of the State Comptroller

Jennifer Paperman

New York Office of the State Comptroller

Daniel Rossi


New York Office of the State Comptroller

Lynda Harbold Schwartz

Upland Advisory LLC

Rosie Tomforde


Regional Government



The COSO/ACFE Fraud Risk Management Guide


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
COSO Framework Components and Principles 1. The organization demonstrates a commitment to integrity and ethical values. Management establishes, with board oversight, structures, reporting lines, and appropriate authorities and responsibilities in the pursuit of objectives. The organization demonstrates a commitment to attract, develop, and retain competent individuals in alignment with objectives. The organization haids individuals accountable for their internal control responsibilities in the pursuit of objectives. The organization specifies objectives with sufficient clarity to enable the identification and assessment of risks relating to objectives. Mapping of **COSO** The organization considers the potential for fraud in assessing risks to the achievement of objectives. Components and The organization identifies and assesses changes that could significantly impact the system of internal control. Principles to the 10. The organization selects and develops control activities that contribute to the mitigation of risks to the achievement of objectives to acceptable levels. Fraud Risk Management Guide The organization obtains or generates and uses relevant, quality information to support the functioning of other components of internal control. 4. The organization establishes a communication process to obtain information about potential fraud and deploys a coordinated approach to investigation and corrective action to address fraud appropriately and in a timely margier. 14. The organization internally communicates information, including objectives and responsibilities for internal control, necessary to support the functioning of internal control. 15. The organization communicates with external parties regarding matters affecting the functioning of other components of internal control. 5. The organization selects develops, and performs omparing exhibitions to secretis whether each of the five principles of treat risk management is present and hardlaring and communicates Fraud hisk Management Program eliberacists in a time-mariner to parties responsible for hadrop corrective action, throulding senior management and the boar of directions.



May 9, 2019

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
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
Annual Spring Conference


Appendix F-3. Sample Fraud Policy Responsibility Matrix This sample matrix can be used as a tool to summarize and visualize the fraud risk governance responsibilities that have been defined for the organization. Entries shown are for example only. 1. Fraud Risk Management Oversight P 2. Code of Conduct/Fraud Control 4. Fraud Risk Assessment P S S S S S S S S 7. Hotline/Ethics Line PSSSS 8. Reporting of Concerns/ Complaints/Violations SR SR SR SR SR SR SR 9. Evaluation of Reported Incidents P S SR S S 10. Fraud/Miscanduct Investigations S SR S P S S 11, Whistleblower Follow-Up SR P 12. Referral to Law Enforcement S P 13. Regulatory Self-Disclosure S P SR 14. Civil Litigation P S 15. Asset Recovery P 16. Monitor Recoveries P S





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












Updated Guide Can Be Used:

- Just for complying with Principle #8 performing a fraud risk assessment, or
- For developing and implementing a comprehensive fraud risk management program

So,

You get to work one Monday morning and your boss says,

"Hey, we need to do a fraud risk assessment in order to comply with the new COSO Principle about fraud risk, and we want you to head up the effort to do that for us. Get started right away and report back when you are done."

So,

You get to work one Monday morning and your boss says,

"Hey, we need to do a fraud risk assessment in order to comply with the new COSO Principle about fraud risk, and we want you to head up the effort to do that for us. Get started right away and report back when you are done."

What would you do?

You could

- (a) Start with your organization's existing internal controls and determine whether they are adequate to mitigate FRAUD risk ...
 - Segregation of duties
 - Approved vendor list
 - Higher level approvals required for large transactions
 - Documentation
 - Physical counts
 - Reconciliations
 - Etc.

You could

- (a) Start with your organization's existing internal controls and determine whether they are adequate to mitigate FRAUD risk ...
 - Segregation of duties
 - Approved vendor list
 - Higher level approvals required for large transactions
 - Documentation
 - Physical counts
 - Reconciliations
 - Etc.

These are all excellent controls designed to ensure accuracy in accounting and financial reporting. But, if your focus is now specifically on fraud, maybe we need something more ...

You could

- (a) Start with your organization's existing internal controls and determine whether they are adequate to mitigate FRAUD risk ...
 - Segregation of duties
 - Approved vendor list
 - Higher level approvals required for large transactions
 - Documentation
 - Physical counts
 - Reconciliations
 - Etc.

From a fraud focus, what if the several people doing these things get together and collude?

You could

- (a) Start with your organization's existing internal controls and determine whether they are adequate to mitigate FRAUD risk ...
 - Segregation of duties
 - Approved vendor list
 - Higher level approvals required for large transactions
 - Documentation
 - Physical counts
 - Reconciliations
 - Etc.

From a fraud focus, what if the several people doing these things get together and collude?

Maybe we need a policy requiring periodic rotation of these duries; and some mechanism to assure that these policies are, in fact, in place...

You could

- (a) Start with your organization's existing internal controls and determine whether they are adequate to mitigate FRAUD risk ...
 - Segregation of duties
 - Approved vendor list
 - Higher level approvals required for large transactions
 - Documentation
 - Physical counts
 - Reconciliations
 - Etc.

From a fraud focus, what if an employee can access the list and add a bogus company?

You could

- (a) Start with your organization's existing internal controls and determine whether they are adequate to mitigate FRAUD risk ...
 - Segregation of duties
 - Approved vendor list
 - Higher level approvals required for large transactions
 - Documentation
 - Physical counts
 - Reconciliations
 - Etc.

From a fraud focus, what if an employee can access the list and add a bogus company?

Maybe we need to use data analytics to periodically compare all fields in our vendor and employee data bases ...

You could

- (a) Start with your organization's existing internal controls and determine whether they are adequate to mitigate FRAUD risk ...
 - Segregation of duties
 - Approved vendor list
 - Higher level approvals required for large transactions
 - Documentation
 - Physical counts
 - Reconciliations
 - Etc.

From a fraud focus, what if employees split purchases to circumvent this control?

You could

- (a) Start with your organization's existing internal controls and determine whether they are adequate to mitigate FRAUD risk ...
 - Segregation of duties
 - Approved vendor list
 - Higher level approvals required for large transactions
 - Documentation
 - Physical counts
 - Reconciliations
 - Etc.

From a fraud focus, what if employees plit purchases to circumvent this control?

Maybe we need to use digital analysis (Benford's Law) to find evidence of purchase-splitting ...

You could

- (a) Start with your organization's existing internal controls and determine whether they are adequate to mitigate FRAUD risk ...
 - Segregation of duties
 - Approved vendor list
 - Higher level approvals required for large transactions
 - Documentation
 - Physical counts
 - Reconciliations
 - Etc.

From a fraud focus, what if documentation is altered?

You could

- (a) Start with your organization's existing internal controls and determine whether they are adequate to mitigate FRAUD risk ...
 - Segregation of duties
 - Approved vendor list
 - Higher level approvals required for large transactions
 - Documentation
 - Physical counts
 - Reconciliations
 - Etc.

From a fraud focus, what if documentation is altered?

Maybe we need to add some additional software controls designed to prevent/detect altered documents ...

You could

- (a) Start with your organization's existing internal controls and determine whether they are adequate to mitigate FRAUD risk ...
 - Segregation of duties
 - Approved vendor list
 - Higher level approvals required for large transactions
 - Documentation
 - Physical counts
 - Reconciliations
 - Etc.

From a fraud focus, what if inventory is moved during counts; what if boxes are empty?

You could

- (a) Start with your organization's existing internal controls and determine whether they are adequate to mitigate FRAUD risk ...
 - Segregation of duties
 - Approved vendor list
 - Higher level approvals required for large transactions
 - Documentation
 - Physical counts
 - Reconciliations
 - Etc.

From a fraud focus, what if inventory is moved during counts; what if boxes are empty?

Maybe we need to frequently change our inventory process and procedures and do surprise counts on a sample basis...

You could

- (a) Start with your organization's existing internal controls and determine whether they are adequate to mitigate FRAUD risk ...
 - Segregation of duties
 - Approved vendor list
 - Higher level approvals required for large transactions
 - Documentation
 - Physical counts
 - Reconciliations

From a fraud focus, what if subsidiary journals are falsified?

– Etc.

You could

- (a) Start with your organization's existing internal controls and determine whether they are adequate to mitigate FRAUD risk ...
 - Segregation of duties
 - Approved vendor list
 - Higher level approvals required for large transactions
 - Documentation
 - Physical counts
 - Reconciliations

From a fraud focus, what if subsidiary journals are falsified?

Etc.

Maybe we need use data analytics to covertly monitor journal activity...

You could

- (a) Start with your organization's existing internal controls and determine whether they are adequate to mitigate FRAUD risk ...
 - Segregation of duties
 - Approved vendor list
 - Higher level approvals required for large transactions
 - Documentation
 - Physical counts
 - Reconciliations
 - Etc.

This risk assessment method would probably do a pretty good job and would likely satisfy COSO Principle #8.

You could

- (a) Start with your organization's existing internal controls and determine whether they are adequate to mitigate FRAUD risk ...
 - Segregation of duties
 - Approved vendor list
 - Higher level approvals required for large transactions
 - Documentation
 - Physical counts
 - Reconciliations
 - Etc.


This risk assessment method would probably do a pretty good job and would likely satisfy COSO Principle #8.

On the other hand, these controls are all focused on accounting and financial reporting; and we know that many frauds can occur elsewhere ...

So, perhaps you should


 (b) spend \$59 to buy the FRMG, start from scratch, and perform a <u>more comprehensive</u> fraud risk assessment






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



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
Sales register manipulation	Construction loans
Skimming	Real estate
Lapping	Appraisal value
Collection procedures	Fraudulent appraisal
Understated sales	Wire transfer
Theft of checks received	System password compromise
Check for currency substitution	Forged authorizations
Lapping accounts	Unauthorized transfer account.
False entries to sales account	• ATM
Inventory padding	Check and credit card fraud
Theft of cash from register	Counterfeiting checks
Deposit lapping	Check theft
Deposits in transit	Stop payment orders
Fraudulent disbursements	Unauthorized or lost credit cards
False refunds	Counterfeit credit cards
False voids	Mail theft
Small disbursements	Insurance fraud
Check tampering	Dividend shecks
Billing schemes	Settlement checks
Personal purchases with company funds	Premium
Returning merchandise for cash	Fictitious pavee
Creation of false or fictitious vendors, suppliers, or subcontractors	Fictitious death claim
Delivery of purchased assets or inventory to unauthorized locations	Underwriting misrepresentation
Payments for services not received	Vehicle insurance — staged accidents
Recording income on consignment sales	Inflated damages
Recording income on products shipped for trial or evaluation purposes	Rental car fraud
Payroll fraud	Pension fraud
Ghost employees	Inflated final income used in benefit calculation
Falsified hours and salary	Under-reported income in years not used for benefit calculation
Failure to remove terminated employees from payroll	False service reported for service purchase
Failure to report leave taken	Enrolling ineligible persons
Commission sales	Not enrolling all eligible persons
Expense reimbursement	Inventory
Mischaracterized expenses	Misuse of inventory
Overstated expenses	Theft of inventory
Fictitious expenses	Off-site or fictitious inventory
Multiple reimbursements	Purchasing and receiving falsification
Loans	False shipments
Loans to nonexistent borrowers	Concealing inventory shrinkage
Double pledged collateral	- Concealing inventory sormsage
False application information	Misappropriation of intangible assets by:
	misappropriation of intangiore assets by:


Theft of intellectual property	Business diversion
Espionage	Resourcing
Loss of information	Resourcing Financial disclosure of interest in vendors
Spying	
Infiltration	Ownership interest in suppliers
Informants	Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) violations
Trash and waste disposal	Anti-bribery provisions
Surveillance	Books and records violations
Destruction of customer goodwill	Internal control weaknesses
Compromising vendor relationships	Money laundering
Proprietary business opportunities	False statements
	Aiding and abetting fraud by other parties (customers, vendors)
orruption	- Anding and abetting traud by other parties (customers, vendors)
Bribery and gratuities to	
Companies	
Private individuals	
Public officials	_
Embezziement	
False accounting entries	
Unauthorized withdrawals	
Unauthorized disbursements	
Paying personal expenses from bank funds	
Unrecorded cash payments	
Theft of physical property	
Moving money from dormant accounts	
Receipt of bribes, kickbacks, and gratuities	
Bid rigging	
Kickbacks	
Diverted business to vendors	
Over billing	
illegal payments Gifts	
Travel	
Entertainment	
Loans	
Credit card payments for personal items	
Transfers for other than fair value	
Favorable treatment.	
Favorable treatment. Conflicts of interest.	
Purchases	-
Sales	
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Documenting the Fraud Risk Assessment Figure 1. Fraud Risk Management Assessment Matrix Example Licentified Fraud Risk Management Assessment Matrix Examp



FRMG Appendices


A: GLOSSARY

B: ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

C: CONSIDERATIONS FOR SMALLER ENTITIES

D: REFERENCE MATERIAL

E: DATA ANALYTICS



FRMG Appendices

F: SAMPLE GOVERNANCE MATERIALS

F1: FRAUD CONTROL POLICY FRAMEWORK

F2: FRAUD RISK HIGH-LEVEL ASSESSMENT


F3: FRAUD POLICY RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX

F4: FRAUD RISK MANAGEMENT POLICY

F5: FRAUD RISK MANAGEMENT SURVEY

G: LIST OF FRAUD RISK EXPOSURES

H: SAMPLE FRAUD RISK ASSESSMENT



FRMG Appendices

I: FRAUD RISK MANAGEMENT ASSESSMENT SCORECARDS

I1: FRAUD RISK GOVERNANCE


12: FRAUD RISK ASSESSMENT

13: FRAUD CONTROL ACTIVITIES

14: FRAUD INVESTIGATION AND FOLLOWUP


15: FRAUD RISK MANAGEMENT MONITORING


Automated versions of these scorecards reside at the ACFE "Fraud Risk Management Tools" page



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
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
Fraud Investigation and Corrective Action Scorecard

To assess the strength of the organization straid investigation and corrective action processes, craftly assess each area below and corrective action processes, craftly assess each area below and score the area, factor, or consideration needs substantial strengthening and improvement to bring fraud risk down to an acceptable level representation as craftly assess each area below and score the area, factor, or consideration is strong and that traud risk tas been neduced — at least — to a minimally acceptable level action as:

| Creen: indicating that the area, factor, or consideration is strong and that traud risk tas been neduced — at least — to a minimally acceptable level action as:
| Creen: indicating that the area, factor, or consideration is strong and that traud risk tas been neduced — at least — to a minimally acceptable level action as:
| Creen: indicating that the area, factor, or consideration is strong and that traud risk tas been neduced — at least — to a minimally acceptable level action as:
| Creen: indicating that the area, factor or consideration is strong and that traud risk tas been neduced — at least — to a minimally acceptable level action as:
| Creen: indicating that the area, factor or consideration is desired. The area is a strong and that traud risk tas been neduced — at least — to a minimally acceptable level action as:
| Creen: indicating that the area, factor, or consideration is strong and that traud risk tas been neduced — at least — to a minimally acceptable level action as:
| Creen: indicating that the area, factor, or consideration is strong and that traud risk tas been neduced — at least — to a minimally acceptable level action as a strong and the area traud risk tas been neduced — at least — to a minimally acceptable level action as a strong and the area traud risk tas been neduced — at least — to a minimally acceptable level action as a strong and the area traud risk tas been neduced — at least — to a minimally acceptable wi

We have multiple communication paths by which allegations and complaints can be brought to the attention of our organization without naming the alleged perpetrator of fraut.





FRMG Appendices

I: FRAUD RISK MANAGEMENT ASSESSMENT SCORECARDS

I1: FRAUD RISK GOVERNANCE

12: FRAUD RISK ASSESSMENT

13: FRAUD CONTROL ACTIVITIES


14: FRAUD INVESTIGATION AND FOLLOWUP

15: FRAUD RISK MANAGEMENT MONITORING

J: HYPERLINKS TO ADDITIONAL TOOLS

HYPERLINKS TO ADDITIONAL TOOLS

Interactive Scorecards



HYPERLINKS TO ADDITIONAL TOOLS

- Interactive Scorecards
- Points of Focus Documentation Templates

Points of Focus Documentation Templates

Points of Focus and Our Organization's Response

Points of Focus and Supportance Points of Focus and Our Organization's Response Including Cross-References to Other Material and Documentation

Makes an Organization Commitment to Fraud Risk Management — The board of directors and senior management initiate the fraud risk management process by establishing an organizational commitment to detect prevent, and detect fraud.

Supports Fraud Risk Governance — The board of directors and senior management make an organizational commitment to fraud risk management as a key element of corporate governance.

Establishes a Comprehensive Fraud Risk Management Policy — The board of directors and senior management provide a solid foundation of fraud risk management by establishing a comprehensive fraud risk management policy.


Establishes Fraud Risk Governance Roles and Responsibilities throughout the Organization — The board of directors and senior management directors and senior management provides to Insud risk governance.


Document the Fraud Risk Management Program — The board of directors and senior management directors and senior management directors and senior management and in the management program is theroughly documented and updated on a regular basis.


Communicates Fraud Risk Management at all Organizational Levels — The board of directors and senior management grant is thoroughly documented and updated on a regular basis.

HYPERLINKS TO ADDITIONAL TOOLS

- Interactive Scorecards
- Points of Focus Documentation Templates
- Risk Assessment and Follow-up Actions Template







HYPERLINKS TO ADDITIONAL TOOLS


- Interactive Scorecards
- Points of Focus Documentation Templates
- Risk Assessment and Follow-up Actions Template
- Log for allegations of fraud and investigation results

Log for allegations of fraud and investigation results

| Fred Investigation and Corrective Actions Taken
| Fred Investigation and Corrective Actions Taken
| Fred Investigation | Fred Investigation


HYPERLINKS TO ADDITIONAL TOOLS

- Interactive Scorecards
- Points of Focus Documentation Templates
- Risk Assessment and Follow-up Actions Template
- Log for allegations of fraud and investigation results
- Interactive Scorecards
- Library of Data Analytics Tests




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Library of Data Analytics Tests CASH - SKIMMING Review sequential numbering of cash receipts journal to ensure no out-of-sequence numbers Cash Receipts Analysis Vertical analysis of sales accounts, (i.e., cash as a percentage of total assets over time, etc. can be used to detect skimming at a high level) Vertical Analysis Horizontal Analysis forizontal analysis of sales accounts, (i.e., cash percent change over time, can be used to detect skimming at a high level) Current Ratio Analysis Track current assets to current liabilities over time Quick Ratio Analysis (Cash+Securities+Receivables) over Current Liabilities percent change over time Track inventory shrinkage due to unrecorded sales. Inventory detection may include statistical sampling, trend analysis, reviews of receiving reports and inventory records and verification for material requisition and shipping documentation as Inventory Analysis as actual physical inventory counts Red Flags Bank employee questions the validity of a check Red Flags Inspect for a forged endorsement on a check Red Flags nspect for an employee bank account with a name similar to the company name Red Flags nspect for alteration of the check payee or endorsement Analysis of journal entries made to the cash and inventory accounts to identify: (1) False credits to inventory to conceal unrecorded or understated sales, (2) Write-offs related to lost, stolen or obsolete product, (3) Write-offs to accounts Journal Entry Review Journal Entry Review Analysis of journal entries to review suspicous or inaccurate journal entries. Identify larger entries split into smaller entries to avoid exceeding their approval limit. To ensure authorization and validity of the Journal Entry based on the approval limits Journal Entry Review



Library of Data Analytics Tests Corruption: Bid Rigging Compare inventory levels and turnover rates on a by project or by product basis, by region Corruption: Bid Rigging Inventory written-off and then new purchase made (total write-offs and quantities purchased by product) Corruption: Bid Rigging Compare contract awards by vendor (number of contracts won compared to bids submitted) orruption: Bid Rigging Sole sourced contracts - number of bids per contract Check for vague contract specifications: (i) amendments, extension, increases in contract values, (ii) total number of amendments, (iii) original delivery date and final delivery date, (iv) original contract value and final contract value Corruption: Bid Rigging Corruption: Bid Rigging Check for split contract (same vendor, same day) Corruption: Bid Rigging Bids submitted after bid closing date Corruption: Bid Rigging Corruption: Bid Rigging Low bidder drops out, and subcontracts to higher bidder (compare contractor with invoice payee) Corruption: Bid Rigging Fictitious bids - verify bidders and prices



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Library of Data Analytics Tests

	A series of the series at the series of the
Bill & Hold	Analysis of inventory that has been "segregated" or shipped to a third party intermediary where the customer has not taken title and assumed the risks, yet the company has booked this isolated inventory as revenue
Bill & Hold	Identify revenue and receivables recorded prior to shipment
Channel Stuffing	Compare discounts or incentives on a monthly basis to identify unusual spikes at the end of the quarter or year.
Channel Stuffing	Compare sales and corresponding returns on a per customer basis
Debt Swap	Identification of Journal Entries with Net Debit to Liability and Credit to Revenue
Debt Swap	Identification of Journal Entries with Net Debit to Liability and Credit to Expenses
Fake Invoices	Analysis of sequentially numbered invoices
Fake Invoices	Benford's analysis of the first two digits to identify anomalies such as a disproportionate number of invoices starting with 7, 8 or 9
Fake Invoices	Analysis of company names that "sound like" known vendors
Fake Invoices	Examine inventory records to identify locations or items that require specific attention during or after the physical inventory count
Revenue Recognition	Analysis and anomaly detection of the sequence of transactions to identify missing checks, invoices
Revenue Recognition	Compare A/R credit memos to A/P invoices
Revenue Recognition	Compare revenue reported by month and by product line during the current period with comparable prior periods
Revenue Recognition	Confirm with selected, high risk customers relevant contract terms or question company staff regarding shipments near the end of the
Revenue Recognition	Identification of revenue recognized at period end and subsequently reversed or partially reversed
Fraud Triangle Analytics	E-mail analysis of selected employees (accounting or sales) for "Rev Rec" related key words around incentive/pressure, opportunity

NEW TOOL—COMING SOON

APPENDIX G: FRAUD RISK EXPOSURES

The following table illustrates the types of fraud schemes and fraud exposures an organization might encounter. This listing is not meant to be all-inclusive, but rather, to support an initial assessment for an organization to identify areas vulnerable to fraud. This list can seven as a starting point for the risk assessment process. By reviewing this list and asking, "could this happen in our organization," the assessment team will gain an overview understanding of potential fraud risks. More focus will be needed to identify the organization's specific industry, location, and cultural factors that can influence other fraudulent behavior.

Int	ntional manipulation of financial statements through:	
٠	nappropriately reported revenues	
	Fictitious revenues	
	Fraudulent audit confirmations	
	Re-dating or refreshing receivables to conceal uncollectables	
	Manipulation of promotional allowances	
	Improper adjustments to estimates	
	Premature revenue recognition	
	Side agreements	
	Bill and hold	
	Channel stuffing	
Т	Round-trip transactions	
Ξ	Altered or false shipping documents	
	Sell-through agreements	
	Up-front fees	
	Holding accounting periods open	
	Failure to record sales provisions or allowances	
	Manipulating percentage of completion	
	Manipulating estimated costs to complete	
	Improper contract or grant revenue and expense recognition	
	Product substitution	
	False or inflated claims	
	Inflated or unjustified change orders	
	Falsified or unsupported research	
	Falsified effort (time) reporting	
	Cost mischarging	

List of fraud schemes, hyperlinked to underlying definitions and descriptions.

To be expanded through crowdsourcing.

HYPERLINKS TO ADDITIONAL TOOLS

- These tools reside at the ACFE web site
 - http://www.acfe.com/fraudrisktools/tools.aspx
- These are intended to be dynamic and "crowdsourced"
 - As more fraud schemes are discovered, Appendix G will be adjusted accordingly
 - As new data analytic tests are invented, the library of tests will be updated
 - Etc.
- ACFE has formed a Tools Steering Committee to oversee this ongoing process
 - Email me if you would like to get more involved in this effort

FRMG Appendices

G: LIST OF FRAUD RISK EXPOSURES

H: SAMPLE FRAUD RISK ASSESSMENT

I: FRAUD RISK MANAGEMENT ASSESSMENT SCORECARDS

I1: FRAUD RISK GOVERNANCE

12: FRAUD RISK ASSESSMENT

I3: FRAUD CONTROL ACTIVITIES

14: FRAUD INVESTIGATION AND FOLLOWUP

I5: FRAUD RISK MANAGEMENT MONITORING

J: HYPERLINKS TO ADDITIONAL TOOLS

K: MANAGING THE RISK OF FRAUD IN GOVERNMENT

Still not convinced that you need Fraud Risk Management?

- Go to http://www.cottoncpa.com/outreach/thought-leadership/ and download and print the five scorecards
- Go to Staples and buy some red, yellow, and green dots
- At your next board retreat or senior staff meeting, use the scorecards to self assess
- Tape those scorecards on the wall and step back
- If you see a lot of RED, you definitely need to implement fraud risk management

For those of us who work in or for government



GAO's Fraud Risk Management Framework

"While the primary target audience of this study is managers in the U.S. federal government, the practices and concepts described in the Framework may also be applicable to state, local, and foreign government agencies, as well as nonprofit entities that are responsible for fraud risk management."

Cotton& Company


Alignment with COSO

- The COSO Internal Control—Integrated Framework has 5 components
 - · Control Environment
 - · Risk Assessment
 - Has Control Activities
 - Information & Communication
 - · Monitoring Activities
- The GAO Green Book (Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government) has the same 5 components


Information & Communication


■ The COSO ACFE Fraud Risk Management Guide maps to both the COSO internal Control Framework and the Green Book

Cotton& Company



May 9, 2019





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COSO Framework Components and Principles

1. The organization demonstrates a commitment to integrity and ethical values.

Management establishes, with board oversight, structures, reporting lines, and appropriate authorities and responsibilities in the pursuit of objectives.

 The organization demonstrates a commitment to attract, develop, and retain competent individuals in alignment with objectives.

The organization considers the potential for fraud in assessing fisits to the achievement of objectives.
 The organization identifies and assesses changes that could significantly insuct the system of internal control.

10. The organization selects and develops control activities that contribute to the mitination of risks to the achievement of objectives to acceptable levels.

12. The organization obtains or generates and uses relevant, quality information to support the functioning of other components of internal control.

16. The organization selects, develops, and performs origining and/or separate evaluations to ascertain whether the components of internal control are present and functioning. 1. The expanication establishes and communicates a frazar flax Management Portain that discussions the practitions of the board offencies and seiner management and that commitment to light integrity and efficial values regarding managing flaus risk.


2. The expanication performs congreptensive traud of the expansion of the properties of the properties


NOT in the GAO Framework

Evaluate Outcomes Using a Risk-Based Approach and

 The organization establishes a communication process to obtain information about potential traud and diploys a coordinable approach to investigation and corrective action to address fraud appropriately and in a timely manner.

5. The organization selects develops, and performs organing evaluations to assertain whether each of the five principles of fload risk management is present and functioning and communications frough float Management Program deficiencies in a timely manner to parties responsible to taking corrective action, including sentior management and the bearn of directive.






My Predictions for the Future:
What Can/Should Be Done to
Empower Auditors to Find
More Fraud; and Help
Organizations Better Manage
Fraud?


What Can We Expect to See in the Future?


Data analytics will be where most of the focus will be



What Can We Expect to See in the Future?

- Data analytics will be where most of the focus will be
- More emphasis on "hotline" employee reporting





What Can We Expect to See in the Future?

- Data analytics will be where most of the focus will be
- More emphasis on "hotline" employee reporting
- More auditor focus on fraud risk management (FRM)

What Does FRM Mean for External Auditors?

- External auditors are required to assess fraud risk
- Audits are risk-based: higher risk = more audit work needed = higher audit fees
- If you tell your auditors that you have implemented rigorous fraud risk management processes, their assessment of fraud risk should go down ...

Prediction:

- Auditing standards will be revised to REQUIRE auditors to evaluate and test management's fraud risk management system and processes
- Similar to the existing requirement that auditors must evaluate and test management's system of internal control

For consideration and pilot testing:

- Auditing standards already require auditors to conduct expanded inquiries about fraud (i.e. talk to employees throughout the organization about fraud possibilities)
- Let's have auditors set up an "audit hotline" website at the beginning of the audit and make it known to and accessible by every auditee employee

What Can We Expect to See in the Future?

- Data analytics will be where most of the focus will be
- More emphasis on "hotline" employee reporting
- More auditor focus on fraud risk management (FRM)
- Perhaps, a 3rd COSO Framework



